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Abstract. Research Institutions (RIs) in last decades have been involved in both production
of technological applications and commercialization of research results for the sake of
technology transfer. These tasks are frequently taken as overlapping both in theory and
practice, whereas they should be ideally separated. The present paper focuses on the latter,
by questioning why RIs have to be involved into commercialization of research. Drawing
on the identification of coordination needs among demand and supply of technological
opportunities, evidence of five extensive case studies of Technology Transfer Organizations
(TTOs) belonging to RIs is analyzed, with regard to the efficiency of the process of
opportunity recognition. The claim for superior efficiency of RIs in technology transfer
depends, in a static perspective, on an expected superior capacity of TTOs to manage
existing knowledge. However, in practice, TTOs do not always exploit available sources of
efficiency gains. Implications for management of knowledge and technology transfer are
discussed.
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he present work aims at contributing to
the understanding of the mechanisms of
technology diffusion from science to
market by looking at the intermediate actors that
are in charge for making knowledge transfer
effective. These actors are Industrial Liaison
Offices, Campus Ventures, Offices for
Technology Transfer, and so on, that in the
following will be addressed as “Technology
Transfer Organizations” (TTOs). Their jobs
typically include prior-art screening, patent
filing services, marketing of technological
assets, licensing agreements, industry
partnership procurement, IPR management, as
well as creation of spin-offs and early growth of
high technology ventures, the latter role having
become more and more important in the last
decade (Feldman et al., 2002; Bray and Lee,
2000; Lockett et al., 2003).
A critical task of TTOs is to provide
coordination in the market for technological
opportunities. As literature on market failures in
technology transfer has widely pointed out,
coordination in this market does not arise
spontaneously, since it is made ineffective by
the existence of a set of sticknesses that
ultimately depends on the nature of knowledge
to be transmitted. In recent years an impressive
body of literature has been published that took
into account the enlargement of RIs’ mission to
technology transfer issues (Thursby and
Thursby, 2002; Etzkowitz et al., 2000) and the
effect of this shift over long term technological
change. The present work aims at contributing
to the understanding of the efficiency of current
model of TTOs as market coordinators, i.e. of
the efficiency of a solution that assigns
ownership and control of operations to an
upstream integrated research actor, vs. a non-
integrated one. In order to do this, I analyze the
process of technology transfer in five TTOs
belonging to a parent RI, with special focus on
their capacity to perform efficient opportunity
recognition (Shane, 2000). The contribution of
this paper is firstly to identify some of the
organizational variables that are capable to
explain efficiency of opportunity recognition in
technology transfer operations (Siegel et al.,
2003a); and secondly to shed light on the
benefits that can be reasonably expected by a
model in which this activities are performed by
RIs, in term of efficiency gains in the treatment
of information and exploitation of existing
competencies in a static comparative efficiency
framework.
The article is organized as follows: section 2
briefly addresses TTO as the targeted unit of
analysis of field research. In section 3, I build up
the theoretical framework that will lead the
empirical search. Case studies are presented in
section 4. Section 5 discusses the results and the
implications for both technology transfer policy
and management of TTOs.
1.  Theoretical framework
Given that TTOs seek to provide organizational
solutions to coordination failures in market for
technology transfer, in the following, I will
address the issue of the efficiency gains that can
be enabled by a model where scientific
institutions (i.e. an upstream integrated actor)
perform this task. In order to guide the search
within case studies, in this section I identify a
set of organizational variables and practices that
have impact over technology transfer potential
and suggest a direction of causality over
capacity to overcome market failures in
technology transfer and to enable better
exploitation of new knowledge.
A first problem in coordination is related to
the transaction costs associated with asymmetric
information between the supplier of new
knowledge – the scientist - and the potential
buyers – firms and industrial players - which
raises expectation of opportunistic behavior. As
literature on venture capitals and finance of
high-technology ventures have explained, the
problem of asymmetric information is
particularly hard to tackle in this kind of market,
given the specificity and knowledge-intensity of
goods traded, which requires a highly
sophisticated knowledge to process technology
due-diligence and forecast market potential
(Cable and Shane, 1997; Murray and Lott, 1995;
Roberts, 1991b). The closer the technological
good to the state-of-art, the harder to find the
T
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knowledge endowment required for the
evaluation. Moreover, the more sophisticated
the technological good, the lower the probability
that the same knowledge will be re-saleable in
successive transactions. Therefore, high specific
fix costs associated with the evaluation process
result in an inability of market players to
provide effective opportunity recognition,
particularly with regard to initiatives that require
a small amount of capital invested (seed capital
finance). Note that the market failure argument
here is rooted in the supposed separation
between supplier and adopters of an innovation
(Martin and Scott, 2000), which raises the
argument of private information and inadequate
absorptive capacity enhancing transaction costs.
From this point of view, we can expect a
vertical-integrated actor sharing knowledge with
research departments to be facilitated in the
process of opportunity recognition, to the extent
that it can apply a set of knowledge and
information already available within the parent
organization, thus exploiting economies of
scope in knowledge treatment.
Valuable knowledge for technology transfer
operations is at least of two kinds: 1) private
information on the characteristics and value of
the piece of knowledge; and 2) scientific and
technological competencies needed to
evaluate/recognize technological opportunities.
Private information relates mainly to the
characteristics and skills of the researcher, to
his/her commitment to the project and to the
value of technology that has to be traded,
especially with regard to its potential future
development (Shane and Cable, 2002; Shane
and Stuart, 2002). Yet, expectation of long-term
relationship with RI reduces the incentives for
the researcher to retain private information and
engage in opportunistic behavior with internal
TTO. However, in many cases, the researcher
itself is not a reliable judge of the value of
his/her technology; hence, the previous
information, which cannot be directly
observable nor credibly signaled in advance, can
be efficiently inferred form previous
relationship with parent, performance record,
eminence of scientists and of research team.
Therefore, I expect that a share of information
with parent enable lower asymmetric
information between the parties and reduced
expectation of opportunistic behavior. Similarly
to the previous, parent organization may also be
a supplier of competencies to apply in the
evaluation of technological assets for
identification and exploitation of valuable
opportunities. Evaluation of a technological
good that is presumably close to the state-of-art
requires to the evaluator a portfolio of scientific
and technological competencies. In this respect
internal flow of people or consulting services,
may be particularly valuable to the extent that it
ensures access to sophisticated knowledge at a
transfer price, which is lower than the
equilibrium price on the market of resources.
Ultimately, the parent research organization
may be a source of technological opportunities
capable of commercial exploitation, as well as a
supplier of competencies to apply in the
technology transfer process. Therefore, a RI that
integrates vertically to provide technology
transfer services and creates a TTO to market its
research may obtain efficiency gains by
enabling effective share of information and
knowledge between the research departments
and the technology transfer unit. Therefore, I
expect that:
1) In a research-integrated TTO, private
information available in parent RI is used
to lower the expectation of opportunistic
behavior;
2) In research-integrated TTO, competencies
of parent RI are used to lower evaluation
costs and to enhance capacity to recognize
opportunities.
I will interpret share of knowledge in the
form described by previous statements as
supporting the hypothesis that a research-
integrated design of technology transfer
activities, ceteris paribus, provides a more
efficient coordination of the market of
technological goods, by making more efficient
use of existing knowledge.
TTOs may also have a second source of
organizational advantage to tackle asymmetric
information. As a recent stream of literature has
highlighted, supply of technological
opportunities is self-constrained by the behavior
of researchers that generate new knowledge.
Firstly, retention of disclosures may arise
because researcher may lack the capacity to
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foresee market potential for the results of his/her
own work (Thursby et al., 2001; Owen-Smith
and Powell, 2001). Secondly, given that
researcher is subject to a multi-task optimization
function, disclosure do not occur unless it is
incentive-compatible, hence an unbalanced
incentive system generates self-retention of
potentially valuable opportunities. Now, because
research career depends on the number and
quality of scientific publications and because
there is at least a short-term trade-off among
scientific publication and market exploitation of
results (Thursby and Thursby, 2002), it is
reasonable to expect the probability for a
researcher to quit disclosure and to go for open
publication to be higher among young and
untenured people, i.e. those that face a higher
marginal benefit of publication (Siegel et al.,
2003b). In other words, if we assume a non-
linear return of effort on career, researchers will
be more reluctant to disclose and delay
publication in strongly upward-sloped portions
of their career path, which normally occur quite
early in working age. As a result, because the
probability of finding both higher productivity
of research (Levin and Stephan, 1991; Morgan
et al., 2001) and superior entrepreneurial attitude
is also higher among young researchers
(Roberts, 1991a), the subset of opportunities
spontaneously submitted to internal TTO may
be adversely selected. This is true even when
researcher has a contractual due to retain from
dissemination because we normally observe no
enforcement to the right of university to hamper
early free circulation of knowledge (Siegel et
al., 2003b). Access to results of research is not
ensured even to internal players and, given the
complex framework of agent-principal
relationships within the RI (Jensen et al., 2003),
the population of disclosed results may not only
be self-constrained, but also adversely selected.
In the following I want to inquire if hierarchical
control may effectively substitute for failure in
providing an alignment of incentives. If this is
verified, a direct access to research units should
result in enhanced disclosures and lower
adversely selected population of input
technological assets; hence, ultimately, in
superior technology transfer performances.
The previous argument suggests focusing
field research upon the mechanisms of
disclosure from scientists to TTO in order to
understand how organizational design of
technology transfer activities may tackle the
sources of ex-ante adverse selection. As a
starting point, I expect that:
3) In a research-integrated TTO, direct
observability of research results lower
self-retention and adverse selection of
input technological goods.
2. Case studies analysis
In the following I present results of an empirical
analysis conducted during spring-summer 2003
on five European (British and Italian) TTOs
fully owned by a parent RI. Collection of
information was conducted in the form of semi-
structured extensive interviews with members of
staff. After first contact with the target TTO,
preliminary information collection was made
through web-search and a draft of questions was
sent to prepare for face to face meetings.
Depending on the size of organization, a number
of interviews were scheduled with operative
members - basically function/unit managers - to
have a good representation of all non-
administrative activities carried on at the
institutional level. Overall, 2.2 interviews on
average for each organization were conducted,
lasting from 15 to 105 minutes.
TTOs selected represent a convenience
sample of Italian and UK institutions (some
general information on activities of 5 TTOs is
provided in table 1). Search for cases was done
among the most relevant and successful
organizations in both countries. Some degree of
excellence in selection of cases was needed
because current population of TTOs is highly
skewed with regard to all indicators of
performances and activities. Clearly, for the
sake of analyzing internal design of TTOs, there
was the need to select case studies showing a
substantial organization of activities, the case of
poor results being –trivially- one of almost no
activities performed. Nevertheless, the sample
of cases was selected so to ensure a good degree
of variance in the IPR policy adopted by the
parent and of organizational structure,
governance and principal–agent relationship.
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8
Table 1: Case studies. General characteristic
Case study Ownership Activities
% revenues share to 
researcher
Establi
shed
Patent 
licensed
Spin-off 
created
UVL Ltd. UMIST
IP/patent services; 
licensing; 
spin-off creation; 
research agreements
75% up to 5,000£
60% up to 20,000£
50% over 20,000£
1988 75 38
Cambridge 
Enterprise     
University of 
Cambridge
IP/patent services; licensing; 
spin-off creation; investment in 
high-tec ventures;
entrepreneurship education
90% up to 20,000£
70% up to 60,000£
50% up to 100,000£
33.3% over 100,000£
2003 n.a. n.a.
Manchester 
Innovation Ltd. 
University of 
Manchester
IP/patent services; 
licensing; 
spin-off creation; 
incubation facilities
negotiated case by 
case  
2000 27 25
Reteventures     
INFM (51%)
INSTM (35%)
CSGI (16%) 
IP/patent services; 
licensing; 
spin-off creation; 
research agreements
to be negotiated 
(in any case > 85%); 
2000 1 4
OBT of Science 
Park Raf spa
Science Park 
Raf spa
IP/patent services; 
licensing; 
spin-off creation; 
research agreements
50% up tp 500,000€
25% up to 600,000€
10% over 600,000€
1995 45 2
UMIST Ventures Ltd. (UVL)
UVL is located in Fairbairn Building, standing
in the middle of UMIST Area of Manchester
Campus, few hundred meters far from the
university main building. The campus area is
just south of Manchester city center and
includes the majority of buildings of three of the
four local universities. Contrary to the great
majority of British universities, UMIST does not
claim IPRs on the results of employees’ work,
so that researcher has no due to disclose to
internal legal office and to keep the secrecy over
exploitable technological innovations. At
present, UVL non-administrative staff is
grouped into three functional units: ‘Intellectual
Property and Licensing’, ‘Venturing and Spin-
off’, and ‘Collaborative Research and Contract
Management’.
Disclosure mechanism. To encourage disclosure
and submission of technological innovations,
UVL schedules every year a plan of research
auditing at the department level to have an
overview of the projects going on within the
campus and to meet research staff. Traditional
cultural resistance was signaled by the staff in
approaching departments and scheduling
meetings, although willingness of scientists to
deal with commercialization activities is
perceived to be increasing over time and among
younger members. Interviewed staff claimed
that research auditing has a strong impact over
disclosures, with on average one/two contacts
immediately following each meeting. This
supports the hypotheses that activities of TTO
can have some effect in reducing self-retention
of opportunities, when caused by low awareness
of scientists on potential value of applications.
Still, nothing can be said about the quality of
disclosures and overall there seems to be no
mechanism preventing adverse selection of
technologies submitted.
Share of knowledge. For what the opportunity
recognition process concerns, evidence of
effective share of knowledge between UVL and
parent staff is very poor. No competencies for
evaluation or consulting are borrowed from
organizational structure of parent; evaluation are
conducted by the five members of UVL “IP and
Venturing” staff, that have good background in
marketing and communication, sometimes
coupled with Biochemistry, Electronic
Engineering and Physics graduate education;
check for novelty of innovation and prior-art is
outsourced to an external consulting company,
whereas UVL staff screens market interest by
contacting a pull of industrial partners and
potential buyers, normally indicated by the
scientist. This practice, that seems to be widely
adopted according to the empirical literature
(Owen-Smith and Powell, 2003), suggests that
UVL relies on knowledge of external players,
rather than parent’s. Additional competencies or
Ceris-Cnr, W.P. N°  15/2004
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peered scientific opinions are occasionally
outsourced to external independent consultants,
but normally in later stages of development.
Moreover, there seems to be some systematic
constraint to knowledge share, as staff reported
scientists to be often reluctant in enabling
communication of results, even to colleagues
and other members of scientific community, due
to fear of loosing control over valuable
information and also to the poor status
associated with commercialization of research in
the scientific community. Therefore, I have
found no evidence of internal management of
competencies and existing knowledge: UVL is
organized as a self-standing unit that is neither
asked nor allowed to mobilize knowledge of
parent for technology transfer purposes, both in
the form of private information and exchange of
competencies for opportunity recognition.
Cambridge Enterprise (CE)
Cambridge Enterprises has been recently created
from the merger of four previous organizations
that variously dealt with technology transfer
within the University of Cambridge: Cambridge
Technology Transfer Office, Cambridge
Challenge Fund for early finance of technology
ventures, Cambridge Entrepreneurship Centre
for education on entrepreneurship and firm
creation and Cambridge University Technical
Services Ltd. Cambridge excellence in research
and teaching needs no presentation. On the
following, I will describe the set of guidelines
that have been approved for the reorganization
and future operation of Cambridge Enterprises,
updated at the beginning of summer 2003,
which however reflects the best practices
developed in past experience. At the moment,
university according to UK low claims only
IPRs over externally funded research, whereas
scientists currently own the IPRs over results
created as part of their normal employment
contract. However, a new IPR policy has been
recently proposed (October 2002), which
substantially extends university rights to all
results of research.
Disclosure mechanism. As part of the
institutional policy, CE does not accomplish any
activity like research scouting and search for
disclosures. CE staff reported that this was
perceived to be disturbing by scientists and
eventually signaled to place greater interest in
the pool of business ideas that comes out of
university higher education programs on
Entrepreneurship. Therefore, CE can only be
activated by spontaneous submission of
researchers, who exert substantial control over
research exploitation and chooses whether to
disclose or not, regardless of the IPR regime to
whom the results are subjected. Therefore, I
have found no support to claim for an unbiased
access of CE to the research conducted within
Cambridge labs and research departments. On
the contrary, the role played by the scientist in
deciding the destiny of research is simply made
more explicit, as confirmed by the new policy
assessment that includes an informal
commitment of the university not to
commercialize results contrary to the indication
of researcher. In this respect, University of
Cambridge seems to distinguish the right to
decide whether the research should undergo a
profit vs. no-profit diffusion path and the right
to participate in the share of revenues generated.
Whereas the former implies a role for
institutional management of results, including
control over disclosure, the latter corresponds in
the right to exert an exclusive (or preferential)
option over all those results that are intended to
generate revenues (Sampat and Nelson, 1999).
Share of knowledge. After disclosure has been
occurred and after a preliminary screening on
prior-art and patentability has led to positive
response, CE organization of technology
transfer activities is again very peculiar and
involves a strong attempt to make effective
management of existing knowledge. As a first
step, project is assigned to a project manager,
whose commitment is to develop a feasible idea
and formulate an evaluation in four weeks time.
In order to complete evaluation and in the
perspective of future development, CE manager
is free to assemble a project team by grouping a
maximum of five/six people, including the
researcher, to help collection of needed
information and to provide a pattern of
competencies for opportunity recognition and
development. Selection of members is made
from a pull candidates estimated in
approximately 120 mentors that may belong to
research units and university staff or to the
Ceris-Cnr, W.P. N°  15/2004
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wider social network of Cambridge community
likewise. Dimension of team and involvement of
members is decided on a case-by-case basis,
depending on the nature and complexity of
project and on its development stage and is
certainly consistent with the broadness of
scientific fields of research applications. A
standard-type team for a complex project, for
instance one that involves creation of a new
venture, has been described by staff as grouping:
a member of university Technology Transfer
Office, who is responsible for IPR protection
and legal consulting, a person having a strong
and relevant scientific background providing
technological support, an expert in company
creation, as a serial business angel or previous
high-technology entrepreneur, and a
professional for commercial, marketing,
negotiation and finance activities, often coming
from the Business School Faculty. The case of
CE therefore provides a good example on how
parent RI can enhance its technology transfer
potential by managing existing knowledge. Note
that skills of Project Manager are mainly those
of networking among mentors, the main task
being to ensure effective decision making for
the development of innovation within the
scheduled time. Network ties in which managers
are involved also ensure a steady flow of
information across the boundaries of internal
units, which also gives support to the
proposition made in the previous section. Note
that the benefit of upstream integration is
ensured by network capacities as well as
research potential of parent.
Manchester Innovation Ltd. (MIL)
Manchester Innovation Ltd. is the only campus
venture fully owned by University of
Manchester (UoM) and is currently in charge of
managing all IPRs over internal research. MIL is
located in the middle of Manchester campus
area, in the same building where it is also hosted
the only Incubator of Manchester campus,
specialized in biotechnology ventures.
University of Manchester has excellent research
ratings for a number of scientific fields that
generate exploitable technological assets (Jensen
and Thursby, 2001), mainly Biological Sciences,
Pre-Clinical Studies, Pharmacies, Computer
Sciences, Pure Mathematics, Mechanical,
Aeronautical and Manufacturing Engineering,
Metallurgy/Materials and Physics. UoM claims
all IPRs on research output and seems to be
quite concerned in protecting exploitable results
from dissemination. Members of staff are
explicitly asked to retain from undue publication
and from all use of results that can prevent UoM
from claiming rights and to collaborate with
MIL for all operations required to undergo
commercial exploitation.
Disclosure mechanism. Members of staff
reported that MIL normally devotes time and
resources to the organization of internal events
and a scouting campaign to enhance the rate of
disclosures and foster the collaboration climate
with research units. However, MIL staff
reported that the most effective results on the
side of disclosures were achieved when there
was a good collaboration between TTO and the
Head of Departments. In those cases, disclosures
had often been urged by departments, which
certainly benefited direct information over
research conducted internally. To the extent that
this mechanism is effective, TTO may
substantially delegate control over undue
dissemination directly to research units, which
enables a more unbiased access to exploitable
results. In other words, if the described
mechanism is effective, I expect control over
dissemination of internal staff to be able to
compensate for misalignment of incentives at
least partially. In this respect, a research-
integrated organization of TT may be more
efficient at least in the short term than
comparable independent market actors.
Share of knowledge. I expect that effective
collaboration with Head of Departments, where
it exists, may also involve some substantial
exchange of information about technological
assets and about people, which gives support to
the proposition sub 2. For what the exchange of
competencies concerns, similarly to some other
cases, MIL seems to have a fully independent
structure that does not include borrowing
competencies from internal units. However,
there seems to be a stronger concern on
technological competencies needed in
opportunity recognition, as all current five
Business Development Managers, in charge of
Ceris-Cnr, W.P. N°  15/2004
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both evaluation of technological assets and
successive management of development stage,
have a strong scientific background -namely a
Ph.D. education in either Life Sciences,
Chemistry or Physics- in some cases coupled
with previous experience in business or MBA
education. Note that scientific backgrounds are
overall consistent with the fields of
technological excellence of parent, therefore
each manager is asked to follow those project
where he/she had technological competencies.
This may partially lower the value added of
borrowing competencies from organizational
structure, at least for those results of research
that are not very close to the state-of-art.
However, staff reported that external consulting
help has been used in case of overloading,
which expressively excludes use of internal
competencies.
Rete Ventures SCrl (RV)
RV is a joint venture of three Italian research
partners: INFM (Italian Institute for the Physics
of Matter), INSTM (Consortium of Italian
Universities for the Science and Technology of
Materials) and CSGI (Inter-university
Consortium for the Development of Big
Interphase Systems). Each of the partners that
jointly own RV runs a no-profit network of
research units and researchers that are hosted
within the research departments of national
public university institutions, voluntary joining
the networks to receive research grants. Overall,
the research units involved in the networks are
nearly a hundred, localized across the Italian
regions and specialized in the research and
development within the fields of New Materials
Engineering, Biophysics, Computing and
Microelectronics.
RV has been founded as a private company in
2000 and is currently organized in three
operative units, all located outside campus areas
in Turin, Genoa and Florence, whose
commitment is to offer technology transfer
services to members of the networks. According
to Italian 2001 regulation, researchers own all
the IPRs over research results, therefore they do
not have any due to disclose. In case they extract
rents from research assets, they have to
compensate the RI that originally provided
research grants and facilities with a percentage
of profits that is always lower than 50%.
Additionally, if researcher asks for technology
transfer services, RV charges a fee (not
representing a market price) only in case of
profits.
Disclosure mechanism. Consistent with Italian
regulation, RV does not have any exclusive -and
in many cases not even a preferential- access to
innovations of partners’ members. This is
because, in many cases, the universities where
researchers are hosted have also some
institutional organization that is in charge of
technology transfer. As a result, RV may be
somehow in competition with other TTOs for
the supply of services. To promote contacts with
researchers, RV runs communication campaigns
by organizing events in partner institutions,
which is claimed to enhance first contact with
researcher and successive disclosure. As in
previous cases, RV action seems to have some
effect in reducing self-retention that is due to
lack of entrepreneurship, whereas I have found
no evidence of mechanisms that may prevent
form adverse-selection of submitted
technological opportunities.
Share of knowledge. With regard to evaluation
of technological assets and opportunity
recognition capacity, I have found, as in some
previous cases, that RV is organized as a totally
self-standing organization, with no
competencies borrowed from parents.
Evaluation of opportunities for development of
research assets is conducted jointly by internal
IP and legal staff and project managers, whereas
the writing of patents is systematically
outsourced to an external consultant. Among the
three project managers currently working in RV,
two have a strong scientific background in
Physics and Chemistry, which is consistent with
the scientific fields of application and one has a
business and marketing education. However,
members of staff have signaled that
collaboration with some researchers and parent
key people is sometimes particularly strong,
thus involving free exchange of information
following a disclosure, with a broad informal
network of people being activated and
apparently no strong dues to keep confidentiality
of results. Therefore, I can expect that some
Ceris-Cnr, W.P. N°  15/2004
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circulation of private information among
network members is effective, which enhances
the climate of trust among the parties of
negotiation.
Office of Biotechnology Transfer (OBT)
of Science Park Raf spa (SPR)
Science Park Raf spa (SPR) is the limited
company created by S. Raffaele Hospital
Foundation to manage the science park hosted
within S. Raffaele Hospital (SRH). The SRH
area is located east of Milan town center and
currently includes clinical departments,
laboratories for basic research, as well as a
medical school and university (hosted, but not
belonging to SRH Foundation), and a small
science park (SPR) that currently owns the
Office for Biotechnology Transfer (OBT), a
conference meeting center and ten private
company labs. SRH is a private no-profit
foundation with excellent research ratings in
Molecular Biology and Genetics and good
reputation for clinical trials and drug testing.
Given the strong specialization of basic research
held in parent organization, OBT is also highly
focussed on Biotechnology, therefore
technology transfer is strongly dependent on
patent activities. According to the private nature
of SRH, IPR over results of all internal research
belongs to the institution, with the scientist
having a contractual due for disclosure and
being compensated with a share of the profit
eventually generated.
Disclosure mechanism. Interviewed staff
described disclosure of scientists to OBT as
occurring spontaneously, the retention of
information being considered negligible. This
situation, that seems to be inconsistent with
what reported in the previous cases, can be
explained at least by two possible sets of
reasons. First of all, there is certainly the effect
of the scientific field of interest: because patent
protection in Biotechnology tends to be ensured
for basic discoveries, and because the file of a
patent has been recently given increasing
importance even in scientific curricula,
misalignment of incentives has certainly a lower
impact than in other scientific disciplines.
Secondly, given the relatively small dimension
of SRH and the narrow focus of its research,
especially with regard to previous cases, strong
communication and direct personal relationship
between members of internal research
community may provide an effective
mechanism of mutual control over undue
dissemination of results. This seems further
supported by the evidence that OBT personnel
and directors of units use to have frequent
meetings to discus about progress of technology
transfer projects which also involve informal
communication about current research and
possible future occasions of development.
Overall, the small size of internal community,
coupled with a co-located TTO and RI
ownership of IPRs seems to create the
conditions for a lower internal asymmetric
information and lower occasions for
opportunistic behavior of members, which gives
support to hp. 3 of unbiased access to internal
results (lower self-retention and lower adverse
selection).
Share of knowledge. For what the process of
opportunity recognition concerns, OBT
organization systematically relies on
competencies borrowed from research
departments. After first disclosure and after
prior art screening has been completed by the IP
staff, researcher is asked to present the result of
his/her job to an internal board that has to decide
whether to patent and further support
development or to quit and release IPRs. The
board is composed by five permanent members:
two people from the IP staff, the director of
SRH, the director of clinical unit and the
director of basic research department, each
counting one vote in the final decision. As part
of the presentation meeting, an invited member,
who is selected on a case-by-case basis from
research staff, is asked to provide a critical
discussion to researcher’s presentation, which
increases information set of permanent members
that have to achieve final decision. Moreover,
given the small size of research community and
the presence of top executives in the decision
board, OBT seems to benefit a systematic share
of private information on capabilities and
commitment of internal staff in negotiations
among the parties. The evidence supports the
idea that OBT relies on effective management of
existing knowledge to perform opportunity
recognition task.
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Table 2: Case studies. Results
Case study Hp .1 Hp .2 Hp .3
Umist Ventures Ltd.
centralised unit in the campus;
UMIST does not claim IPRs over
research
no informal/formal
flows of information;
evaluation is kept
confidential to the rest
of the faculty
no competences
borrowed from parent
structure;
competences are
borrowed from network
of industrial partners
periodical technological
auditing at the level of
departments;
Cambridge Enterprise
centralised unit in the campus,
grouping many functional units;
no IPR over research of employees
IPR over external funded research
internal networking
among people; private
information access
presumed
competences are
borrowed on project
basis by assembling
internal and external
members under
direction of a project
manager
absolutely no search
for proposal; only
voluntary disclosures
Manchester Innovation Ltd .
centralised unit in the campus
incubator in charge of managing all
IPRs on behalf of UoM
good talk with chief of
departments, some
access to private
information is
presumed
no competences
borrowed from parent
structure; good
scientific background
of members of staff
periodical technological
auditing at the level of
departments;
collaboration with chief
of departments
facilitating disclosure
Reteventures
decentralised unit outside campuses
providing TT services on demand to
member departments;
no IPRs over research
good talk with some
departments, some
private information
access is presumed
no competences
borrowed from parent
structure; informal
network can be
activated; good
scientific background
of staff
random access at the
departments for self-
promotion;
servicesprovided on
demand to members of
departments
OBT of Science Park Raf spa
centralised unit inside campus
9incharge of manageing all IPRs on
behalf of SRH
good talk with some
departments, some
private information
access is presumed
competences are
borrowed from parent
structure both
systematically and on
project basis
no search for proposal;
mutual internal control
over undue
dissimination and
substantial alignment
of incentives
3. Results and Conclusions
I have presented evidence of five TTOs that are
in charge of transferring research results into
market on behalf of a parent RI (see Table 2) to
inquire the capacity of research-integrated TTOs
to perform the task of opportunity search and
recognition by making effective management of
existing knowledge, which I have separated in 1.
Disclosure Mechanism and 2. Share of
Knowledge.
Disclosure Mechanism. Given the agent-
principal framework of relationship that stands
within the RIs between Faculty and the TTO
unit (Jensen et al., 2003), self-retention and
adverse selection of technological opportunities
is likely to occur, due to the inability of
scientists to recognize the potential for
technological applications and due to
misalignment of scientists’ incentives coupled
with lack of enforcement. In this respect, I have
found that some TTOs utilize their direct link
with the parent to promote communication and
systematic research auditing in research
departments, which seems to have some effect
in reducing self-retention of opportunities
caused by poor awareness of scientists on
commercial potential of their research. When
IPRs are allocated to scientists, disclosure for
commercial exploitation of research occurs only
to the extent that it is incentive-compatible with
researchers reward system (Lach and
Schankerman, 2003). This is probably the case
of OBT, where the small size of research
community and the scientific field of application
provide good alignment of incentives for
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technology transfer purposes. In case of RI
ownership of IPRs, hierarchical control of RI
over undue dissemination of results may
partially substitute for failure in providing
alignment of incentives. In this respect, I have
found that TTOs may find it hard to exert direct
control over researchers’ actions. However, a
strong commitment to technology transfer of
faculty members, and especially of Head of
Department seems to work at least in the short
run as a mechanism to lower adverse selection
of inputs. As a result, RI Administration can
indirectly enhance control over disclosure by
selecting Head of Departments. This
organizational variable may be of interest for
future research agenda.
Share of knowledge. In the theoretical
framework I have highlighted that parent RI
may be a source of valuable knowledge for
opportunity recognition. Share of knowledge
with parent may have a positive impact to
technology transfer potential in two ways:
because it enhances the climate of trust among
parties involved into negotiation and because it
enables economies of scope over competencies
that already exist in the organizational structure.
According to the previous, I have isolated two
separate levels of share in the analysis: share of
private information and share of competencies.
Valuable private information relates basically
to the skills of researcher, to his/her
commitment to the project and to the
development potential of technological asset. I
have found that this kind of share is hard to
detect, as it occurs informally and staff tends to
be quite sensitive in revealing this information.
However, circulation of private information
seems to occur normally when TTO has some
good talk with research departments and when
organization of activities involves share of
people and of consulting services. In this
respect, an integrated model of TTO seems to
ensure easier communication and flow of
information across the internal boundaries. Still,
I have found that researcher’s ownership of IPR
in one case seems to systematically constrain the
possibility to engage in virtuous circulation of
information.
For what the internal share of competencies is
concerned, I have found greatest variance of
organizational models. In the majority of cases,
TTOs were found to be organized as self-
standing units, performing evaluation and
development of applications independently from
organizational structure of parent. However,
some TTOs seem to have organized their
activities to make systematic use of knowledge
of parent for the sake of opportunity recognition.
This seems certainly to be the case of OBT,
where key people from research departments are
directly involved in technology transfer decision
making, thus ensuring a level of economies of
scale that can never be achieved by external
actors. CE organization also shows a high
degree of competence share in the form of
consulting services provided to TTO at a non-
market price. However, consistently with
broadness of scientific fields, in this case
competencies are borrowed not only from
internal units, but also from external actors.
Hence, CE structure seems to be better
described as a widely networked organization,
where the role of RI is certainly that of
providing exploitable results, competencies for
opportunity recognition as well as networking
and management of environmental knowledge
through long-standing reputation. This role is
certainly highly-context specific and hardly
replicable, but provides evidence of a socially
desirable model of RI involvement in
technology transfer.
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